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1. Introduction
On October 6, 1979, the Federal Reserve System
changed its operating procedures in order to enhance
its control of the money supply. The new procedures,
which employed targets for nonborrowed reserves,
remained in force until the fall of 1982. Though the
Fed itself never characterized its policy as mone-
tarist, it has been widely argued outside the Federal
Reserve that the new procedures constituted a
“monetarist” experiment. It has also been contended
that the attempt by the Fed to control the money
supply through reserve targeting was unsuccessful.
For example, these views are expressed in the fol-
lowing excerpt from a newspaper article that recom-
mended abandonment of the October 1979 operating
procedures [Nordhaus (1982)]:
The first, step [of a new economic policy] would be
to bring down the curtain on the disastrous mone-
tarist experiment of the last two years. The
Federal Reserve should be directed to cease and
desist its mechanical monetary targeting and to set
monetary policy with an eye to inflation and unem-
ployment. . . . At  the same time, the Fed should
overhaul its operating procedures. The techniques
of emphasizing supply of bank reserves rather than
interest rates since October  1979 has produced
greater volatility of both interest rates and the
money supply.
In this article, a chronological review is provided
of the formulation of monetary policy and of the
implementation of the new operating procedures
during this period. Many economists have character-
ized monetary policy in this period in the way de-
scribed above because of the coincidence of Fed
policy actions generally dominated by a desire to
reduce the rate of inflation and of Fed adoption of
reserve, as opposed to funds rate, targeting. The
review provided here, however, stresses the con-
siderable continuity in the formulation of monetary
policy before and after October 1979, rather than the
occurrence of an isolated “monetarist” experiment.
This continuity was provided by the practice of
relaxing implementation of the new procedures when
the behavior of money did not accord with the Fed’s
perception of the behavior of the economy.
The post-October 1979 operating procedures pro-
vided an interesting experiment in monetary control.
They employed a combination of lagged reserve ac-
counting and nonborrowed reserves targets. This
combination requires that monetary control be
effected through indirect control of the funds rate,
rather than through a reserves-money multiplier
relationship. In the review provided below, it is
argued that this characteristic of indirect control of
the funds rate at times contributed in practice to
volatility in the money supply and in interest rates.
2. The Post-October 1979 Operating
Procedures
Prior to October 1979, the Fed had specified
“tolerance ranges” for intra-yearly growth of the
money supply. These tolerance ranges, however, as
emphasized at the time by the Fed, were more aptly
described as benchmarks, rather than as targets.
Deviations of projected money growth from these
tolerance ranges triggered changes in the federal
funds rate, but there was never any presumption that
the resulting changes in the funds rate would be such
as to bring actual money growth into line with the
values specified in the tolerance range [Hetzel
(1981)].
1 After October 1979, in contrast, there
were intervals during which the funds rate was varied
in a  way intended to bring actual growth of the
money supply into line with its intra-yearly targeted
value.
This section presents an abbreviated overview of
the operating procedures adopted on October 1979.
It is assumed, however, that the reader is familiar
with one of the more thorough descriptions available,
for example, Hetzel (1982) or Goodfriend (1982).
* The views in this article are solely those of the author
and, it should be emphasized, do not necessarily reflect
the views of the Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond or
the Federal Reserve System.
1 The FOMC emphasized that the tolerance ranges were
not considered as targets for the money supply. “It was
noted that, perhaps because of the manner in which the
directive was worded, the 2-month ranges of tolerance
for Ml and M2 were subject to misinterpretation as em-
bodying the Committee’s short-run targets for these
aggregates, intended to be achieved by appropriate
changes in the funds rate . . .” [Board of Governors
(1978), FOMC meeting of June 20, 1978, p. 189]. The
purpose of the 2-month ranges was to provide the
Manager with an indicator for determining when changes
in the funds rate were appropriate.
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system’s demand for reserves was essentially pre-
determined in a given reserve accounting period. Of
this predetermined reserve demand, whatever the
Desk did not supply through open market operations
had to be borrowed by the banking system from the
Fed. Given the pressure on commercial banks to find
alternative sources of reserves exerted through the
administration of the discount window, higher levels
of borrowed reserves increased the excess of the
funds rate over the discount rate. The funds rate,
consequently, was determined as the sum of the dis-
count rate plus an amount that varied positively with
the level of borrowed reserves. (The relationship
between the discount rate and the funds rate is shown
in Figure 1. The relationship between borrowed
reserves and the differential between the funds rate
and the discount rate is shown in Figure 2). Ulti-
mately, then, the new procedures worked through a
leverage over the federal funds rate. The funds rate,
which determined the cost of funds to banks, influ-
enced bank portfolio adjustments and, as a by-
product, bank liabilities and the money supply.
At Federal Open Market Committee meetings, the
Fed specified an initial value for borrowed reserves
(termed the initial borrowed reserves assumption).
Given the intra-yearly target for M1 and, conse-
quently, an implied path for total reserves, this initial
Figure 1
FUNDS RATE
AND DISCOUNT RATE PLUS SURCHARGE
Note: From March 1980 through November 1981, in addition
to the basic discount rate, a variable surcharge was applied to
frequent borrowing by large banks from the discount window.
value for borrowed reserves determined the target
for nonborrowed reserves. Given the nonborrowed
reserves target, the movement of total reserves asso-
ciated with a miss of the M1 target produced a
change in the level of borrowed reserves and in the
funds rate. The change in the funds rate acted to
offset misses of M1 from target. In addition to this
kind of “automatic” change in the funds rate, the
Desk could also effect “discretionary” changes by
varying the nonborrowed reserves target.
The remainder of this article presents a chrono-
logical review, from 1979 through 1982, of the im-
plementation of this procedure. The purpose of this
review is to attempt to elucidate the way in which the
new procedures worked in practice.
3. The October 6, 1979 Actions
Starting in the spring of 1979, monetary policy
became concerned with the threat of recession. “The
Federal Open Market Committee received forecasts
from its staff of a recession beginning July 1979 . . .”
[Wallich (1980), p. 3]. Between February and
July 1979, M1 grew at an annualized rate of 9.7
percent, but the funds rate was raised over this
interval by only half a percentage point. By Septem-
ber, M1 and M2 were at the top of the intra-yearly
ranges implied by their four-quarter target ranges.
Figure 2
ADJUSTMENT BORROWING
AND THE DIFFERENTIAL BETWEEN THE
FUNDS RATE AND
THE DISCOUNT RATE PLUS SURCHARGE
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September, inflation and depreciation of the dollar
emerged as the primary concerns.
From the perspective of the Fed in October 1979,
the overriding imperative for monetary policy was to
assuage the inflationary psychology of the public that
manifested itself in speculative activity in commodity
and foreign exchange markets and threatened to
spread to wage setting behavior.
Inflation feeds in part on itself, so part of the job
of returning to a more stable and more productive
economy must, be to break the grip of inflationary
expectations. We have recently  seen clear evidence
of the pervasive influence of inflation and infla-
tionary expectations on the orderly functioning of
financial and commodity markets and on the value
of the dollar internationally. . . . [Volcker (1979b),
pp. 888-9]
. . . in the absence of firm action to deal with infla-
tion and inflationary expectations, there was a
clear risk that the runup in energy prices would
work its way into wages and prices generally,
thereby raising the nation’s underlying inflation
rate. [Volcker (1979c), p. 959]
The actions taken by the Fed on October 6, 1979,
reflected its concern over inflationary psychology.
The Fed felt it had to establish a credible anti-
inflationary stance for monetary policy. New oper-
ating procedures that would allow the Fed to avoid
overshooting its four-quarter target ranges for the
monetary aggregates were considered a prerequisite
for such a policy. “. . .it was clear by early fall that
the growth in money and credit was threatening to
exceed our own targets for the year and was nourish-
ing inflationary expectations” [Volcker (1979c), p.
959].
In this situation, the Fed took actions to limit the
extension of credit that, in its view, was financing
speculative activity. Credit extension by banks was
constrained by the imposition of marginal reserve
requirements on their managed liabilities.  “And we
placed  a special marginal reserve requirement of 8
percent on increases in managed liabilities of larger
banks . . . because that source of funds . . . has fi-
nanced much of the recent excessive buildup in bank
credit” [Volcker (1979c), p. 960]. For the same
reason, the increased variability of the funds rate
under the new operating procedures was considered
important. “. . .in the then existing market circum-
stances, perceptions (right or wrong) that changes
in money market rates would be limited seemed to be
encouraging banks and other lending institutions to
aggressively market credit” [ Volcker (1980b), p.
25]. Finally, the Fed urged banks not to extend
credit for speculative purposes. “The Board of Gov-
ernors has particularly stressed its own concern that,
in a time of limited resources, banks should take care
to avoid financing essentially speculative activity in
commodity, gold and foreign exchange markets”
[Volcker (1979a), p. 4].
On the basis of interviews with four governors
and with Board staff, Woolley (1984, chap. 5) ob-
serves that, in fall 1979, effective money supply
targeting appeared to offer solutions to the Fed’s
immediate problems. First, it was recognized that a
credible anti-inflationary stance would require a
significant rise in interest rates, but there was uncer-
tainty over the magnitude of the rise required. A
way of resolving this problem was to allow the funds
rate to rise by whatever amount was necessary to
prevent an overshoot of the four-quarter target range
for M1. Second, the new procedures allowed full use
of the language of monetary control in communi-
cating to the public the need to raise rates. This
latter point is made in the following quotations from
Fed economists:
By clearly communicating to the public the Federal
Reserve’s  objectives for monetary policy, a mone-
tary aggregates targeting procedure enables pri-
vate decision-makers to better plan their activities
and to make price decisions that are more harmoni-
ous with noninflationary growth in money and
credit. [Axilrod (1981) p. 16]
. . . the use of money stock targets in the context
of winding down excessive monetary growth over
time provides a means of communicating the objec-
tives of policy with the rest of the government and
with the public. . . . It should be noted that the
possibility of defining an anti-inflationary strategy
in terms of a long-term path for intermediate
money growth rate targets, with its attendant
advantages for internal and external communica-
tion, apparently has no analog in interest rate
targets. There is seemingly no satisfactory way to
state a long-term anti-inflation strategy in terms
of nominal or real interest rates as can be done in
the case of money growth targets. [Davis (1981),
pp. 19-20]
In these circumstances, for the first time, the Fed
began to give the Desk meaningful targets for the
money supply. (Prior to October 1979, the FOMC
specified “tolerance ranges,” rather than targets, for
growth of the monetary aggregates. As discussed in
Section 2, these tolerance ranges were not intended
to be targets.) Beginning in October 1979, it replaced
its tolerance ranges for money growth with actual
intra-yearly targets derived from the four-quarter
targets. It is also important to note that the
Humphrey-Hawkins legislation, which took effect in
1979, required that the four-quarter target ranges for
growth of money be applied solely to a fourth-quarter
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been the prior practice. In this way, the phenomenon
of base drift was eliminated over the calendar year.
[Base drift seriously weakens the effectiveness of
monetary targeting through the incorporation of
misses of money from prior targets into new targets.
See Broaddus and Goodfriend (1984).]
Initially, the new procedures appeared to work.
The first significant deviation of M1 from its intra-
yearly target occurred toward the middle of February
1980 when it became clear that M1 was growing in
excess of its target. (See Figure 3.) The Desk
responded by lowering the target for nonborrowed
reserves modestly in late February and significantly
in early March. The Board raised the discount rate
from 12 to 13 percent effective February 15. By the
March 18 FOMC meeting, M1 was back on target.
This experience was one of the two times in the post-
October 1979 period when the Desk responded to a
miss of the M1 target by altering its nonborrowed
reserves target promptly upon appearance of the M1
target miss. (There were a number of occasions
Figure 3
M1 AND FOUR-QUARTER TARGET RANGES
1980 1981 1982 1983
Note: In order to display the data available contemporaneously,
M1 is taken from the first Board of Governors statistical release
H.6 showing complete monthly figures for a given year. In 1980,
M1-B is used. In 1981, shift-adjusted M1-B is used. This series
adjusts other checkable deposits for shifts from nondemand
deposit sources. The discontinuity after 1981 arises from the
discontinuance of the shift adjustment. After October 1982, the
target range for M1 was replaced by a “monitoring” range. The
dual ranges for M1 in 1983 reflect the rebasing of the M1 moni-
toring range in July 1983.
when the target for nonborrowed reserves was
changed, but only after it had become obvious that
the change in borrowed reserves associated with the




The Special Credit Restraint Program (SCRP)
was announced March 14, 1980. According to the
Board press release, the SCRP represented “further
actions to reinforce the effectiveness of the measures
announced in October of 1979” [Board 1980b], The
Fed valued the aspects of the SCRP that allowed it
to restrict bank lending with the intention of reducing
speculative credit extension. “Some parts (of the
SCRP) were quite acceptable to us in terms of what
we call voluntary restraints on banks” [Volcker
(1983d), p. 48]. Specifically, banks were “infor-
mally” required to hold loan growth to within 6 to 9
percent. Also, for large banks, the reserve require-
ment imposed on managed liabilities exceeding a base
level was increased to 10 percent. A surcharge on
the discount rate of three percentage points was
applied to borrowing by large banks. Extension of
consumer credit was discouraged by a special deposit
requirement of 15 percent on increases in covered
types of credit, and increases in assets of money
market mutual funds were subject to a reserve re-
quirement of 15 percent.
As stated in the initial Board press release, the
SCRP was intended to prevent “use of available
credit resources to support essentially speculative uses
of funds.” The sharp effect of this program on cur-
tailing credit extension by banks, however, frustrated
the monetary control aspects of the Fed’s October
1979 actions [Hetzel (1982)]. Just prior to the
introduction of the SCRP, M1 was on target. The
SCRP severely crimped the extension of bank credit
and, in the process, pushed M1 well below its target
range (Figure 3). The strongly depressing effects
of the SCRP on credit extension were unforeseen,
and it was undoubtedly not anticipated that the new
operating procedures and the SCRP would work at
cross purposes. The new operating procedures
caused the drop in M1 to produce a large reduction
in the funds rate. This reduction mitigated the de-
pressing effect of the SCRP on the economy.
2 Discussion of changes in the target for nonborrowed
reserves is contained in the annual “Monetary Policy and
Open Market Operations” reports from the New York
Desk that are published in the Federal Reserve Bank of
New York  Quarterly Review.
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As suggested in the introduction, the new pro-
cedures were allowed to exert their full effect on the
funds rate only when the Fed believed that the be-
havior of the money supply was reflecting the be-
havior of the economy. As shown in Figure 3, 1980
contained an incipient monetary acceleration that
peaked in February and a more sustained accelera-
tion that dominated the second half of the year. In
the latter case, M1 exceeded its intra-yearly targets
from the August 12 through the December 19 FOMC
meetings. In the first instance, but not the second,
the new procedures were applied rigorously from the
very beginning of the monetary acceleration. Only
in the first instance, did the Fed consider, at the start
of the monetary acceleration, that the money supply
was reflecting the behavior of the economy.
In the first quarter of 1980, incoming data indi-
cated considerable strength in the real sector. This
strength was reflected in the strength in M1; there-
fore, the Fed was willing to allow the strength in M1
to raise the funds rate. Incoming data in the second
and third quarters indicated weakness in the econ-
omy, and it was generally accepted by midsummer
that a major recession was under way. The strength
of Ml in the summer did not accord with the current,
widespread perception of weakness in the economy;
therefore, the new procedures were not implemented
in a way that would produce a significant rise in the
funds rate. From the July through the October
FOMC meeting, the intra-yearly target for M1 was
raised from the bottom to the top of the four-quarter
target range. The discount rate was raised a percent-
age point on September 26, but other increases in the
discount rate and significant reductions in the target
for nonborrowed reserves were postponed until No-
vember [Hetzel (1982), pp. 247-8]. As the fall
progressed, it became clear that the recession of late
spring and summer had only been a temporary reac-
tion to the SCRP and that the economy was growing
strongly. As it became clear that the strength in M1
reflected strength in the economy, the Fed became
willing to allow the new procedures to increase the
funds rate sharply.
6. The Working of the New Procedures
Before discussing the behavior of interest rates and
money in the last half of 1980, it is necessary to ex-
plain several aspects of the October 1979 operating
procedures and the environment in which they were
employed. As noted in Section 2, the new procedures
continued to effect monetary control through the
funds rate, rather than through a reserves-money
multiplier relationship. The level of the funds rate
emerged as the sum of the discount rate and a differ-
ential that varied positively with the level of bor-
rowed reserves. Given the predetermined demand
for reserves under lagged reserve accounting, bor-
rowed reserves were determined as a consequence of
the target for nonborrowed reserves.
Monetary control under the new procedures was
rendered difficult through the lack of a reliable model
for deriving the funds rate from the money supply
target.
3 There also was no reliable model for deriving
the level of borrowed reserves that would produce
the desired differential between the funds rate and the
discount rate.
4 Because the level of borrowed re-
serves determined the funds rate (given the discount
rate), it was the key variable in the new monetary
control procedure.
3 The difficulty of associating a value of the funds rate
with the money supply target was clearly recognized at
the time in relation to the former operating procedures.
. . . the operational guide for day-to-day open
market operations before October [1979] had
typically been the federal funds rate. However,
the translation of money stock objectives into
day-to-day management of this rate presupposes
a stable and predictable relationship between the
public’s demand for cash balances and short-term
market rates of interest. This relationship be-
comes particularly difficult to appraise in an
environment of rapid price increases, changing
inflationary expectations, and financial innova-
tions. [Volcker (1980a), p. 139]
4
“. . . the federal funds rate, [which] the market focuses
on as a policy indicator, can vary widely for a given level
of borrowing. Changes in the federal funds rate appear
to be strongly influenced not only by the borrowing level
itself but also by past borrowing experience and by
market expectations of future rate developments” [Levin
and Meek, p. 28]. Goodfriend (1983) formalizes this
statement. Prediction of the relationship between bor-
rowed reserves and the differential between the discount
rate and the funds rate was also rendered difficult by the
periodic use of surcharges over the discount rate that
were applied to borrowing by large banks.
The FOMC specified the value of borrowed reserves
that would begin the interval between FOMC meetings
(termed the initial assumption for borrowing). The
Record of Policy Actions  omits discussion of how this
variable was set. According to the initial description by
the Fed of the new procedures, however, a simple rule of
thumb was employed. “The amount of nonborrowed
reserves-that is total reserves less member bank bor-
rowing-is obtained by initially assuming a level of
borrowing near that prevailing in the most recent period”
[Board (1980a)]. “Typically, the Committee has chosen
levels [of initial borrowed reserves] close to the recently
prevailing average . . .” [“Monetary Policy . . .” (1980),
p. 60]. The annual “Monetary Policy and Open Market
Operations” reviews published by the Desk in the New
York  Quarterly Review  provide lists of the initial values
of borrowed reserves set by the FOMC. Comparison of
these values with values of borrowed reserves observed
for the statement week in which FOMC meetings were
held indicates that this rule of thumb continued to be
employed. (The initial borrowed reserves assumption
was adjusted for erratic movements in the relationship
associating borrowed reserves with the differential be-
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determine in advance the appropriate level of bor-
rowing to be employed in constructing the nonbor-
rowed reserve path consistent with the short-run
money supply target. This level of borrowing
would depend on a projection of market interest
rates consistent with the money supply target path
and knowledge of depository institutions’ willing-
ness to borrow, given the spread between market
rates and the discount rate, and could differ sig-
nificantly from borrowing levels based on or rang-
ing around recent experience. . . . projections of
borrowing demand from interest rate forecasts and
past bank behavior are subject to a considerable
degree of error. [Axilrod (1981), p. 24]
. . . along with the demand for money, the bor-
rowings function remains one of the more trouble-
some specifications in the monthly model. [Tinsley
et al (1982), p. 849]
In the absence of a model that could be employed to
determine reliably the value of borrowed reserves
(and the funds rate) that would produce the targeted
value of the money supply, the level of borrowed
reserves (and the funds rate) was set through the
feedback induced by misses of the M1 target.
The character of the feedback mechanism running
from a miss of the M1 target to changes in the funds
rate was shaped to a significant degree by the be-
havior over time of the relation running from bor-
rowed reserves to the differential between the funds
rate and the discount rate. At the start of a monetary
acceleration, bank use of the discount window is
negligible. Banks are allowed to use the discount
window without the administrative pressure that
causes them to look to the funds market for reserves
and thus force up the funds rate and other market
rates. As a monetary acceleration persists, banks are
forced to use the discount window over an extended
period and become subject to administrative pressure.
Consequently, the passage of time causes a given level
of borrowed reserves to produce a higher differential
between the funds rate and the discount rate.5
tween the funds rate and the discount rate. In particular,
when this differential would change, for a given level of
borrowed reserves, in a way unrelated to the current miss
of the total reserves path, the initial assumption for bor-
rowed reserves was adjusted in order to eliminate the
corresponding erratic movement in the funds rate.)
5 In discussing the monetary acceleration of the last half
of 1980, Levin and Meek argue that the temporal pattern
relating borrowed reserves to the funds rate just de-
scribed was reinforced by the way in which the financial
markets formed their expectations. In particular, a
moderate initial rise in the funds rate in response to a
money supply overshoot led to larger rises later on.
The third, and in some respects, most interesting
episode began in August 1980, when a surge in
money supply led to an immediate rise in dis-
count window borrowing as the demand for total
reserves exceeded the NBR path. H&ever,
since member banks had been essentially out of
It must also be noted that the new procedures al-
tered the significance of discount rate changes for
monetary control. Before October 1979, when the
Desk targeted the funds rate directly, changes in the
discount rate could not affect the level of the funds
rate. After October 1979, the Desk targeted non-
borrowed reserves, while the demand for total re-
serves was essentially predetermined because of
lagged reserve accounting. Consequently, the amount
of reserves the banking system had to borrow in a
reserve accounting period was given. Changes in the
discount rate altered the marginal cost of obtaining
this given amount of reserves; therefore, changes in
the discount rate were passed on directly to the funds
rate (provided the funds rate was above the discount
rate so that the procedures were operable).
After October 1979, the Fed continued to employ
changes in the discount rate to communicate policy
intentions to financial markets. During the 1970s,
the discount rate served as a signal of Fed intentions
with respect to the funds rate. A rise, say, in the
funds rate preceded by a rise in the discount rate
signaled  to the market that the increase in the funds
rate would be long lived. In the fall of 1980, as the
differential between the funds rate and discount rate
widened, the market interpreted the Fed’s willingness
to raise the discount rate as a test of Fed willingness
to allow interest rates to rise to whatever level was
necessary in order to achieve monetary control.
6
the window for some months. upward pressure
on the federal funds rate was modest. . . . Market
participants took the moderate rise in the federal
funds rate as an inadequate response to the con-
tinued rapid expansion of the money supply after
August's 19.3 percent annual rate of growth in
federal ‘funds rate did not rise more vigorously.
Talk that the Federal Reserve was not following
through on its monetary objectives probably
contributed to the widespread resurgence of in-
flationary objectives. . . . The fact that rapid
money growth threatened achievement of the
FOMC’s 1980 objectives fed expectations that
rates would move higher. The markets quickly
translated these expectations into higher rates
in a self-reinforcing process. [Levin and Meek
(1981), pp. 31-3]
6 Levin and Meek commented:
Participants [in financial markets] repeatedly
talked up the likelihood of discount rate increases
as the federal funds rate rose further above the
discount rate-apparently on the theory that
catch-up increases were needed under the flexi-
bility principle specified in the announcement of
the new strategy in October 1979. This inter-
pretation became a part of the market’s assess-
ment of Federal Reserve dedication to monetary
restraint. The rise in the spread was taken as
indicating a further need for discount rate
change rather than a measure of the pressure of
banks’ efforts to avoid recourse to the window.
[Levin and Meek (1981), pp. 33-4]
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF RICHMOND 25A final point, the significance of which is brought
out in the following section, concerns the volatility of
inflationary expectations in the financial markets
during this period. This volatility, it is argued below,
may have interacted with the implementation of the
new procedures in a way that caused monetary
accelerations and decelerations to possess some self-
reinforcing dynamics [Hetzel (1982)]. The mone-
tary acceleration in the last half of 1980 appeared to
have produced uncertainty in the bond market over
the course of long-term rates. Sellers and buyers of
bonds left the long-term markets for short-term
markets. The sellers increased their demand for bank
credit. The buyers only partly turned to the market
for the nonmonetary liabilities of banks. The in-
creased demand for bank credit was, therefore, only
partly matched by an increased demand for the non-
monetary liabilities of banks. The result was to
increase demand deposits and M1 and to reinforce the
monetary acceleration in progress. In addition, re-
intermediation on the asset side of bank balance
sheets became important. Market rates rose as the
monetary acceleration progressed in the last half of
1980. Inertia in the prime rate caused it to lag
market rates. As the customary positive differential
between the prime rate and the paper rate practically
disappeared, businesses shifted out of the paper
market into the market for bank credit. The in-
crease in the demand for bank credit added to deposit
creation and reinforced the existing monetary ac-
celeration.
To summarize, to the usual difficulties of trying to
effect monetary control through the funds rate, the
new procedures added several additional uncertain-
ties surrounding the relationship between the level of
borrowing and the funds rate. Moreover, the dis-
count rate assumed a new and more significant role
under the new procedures. With the background in
this section, it is now possible to discuss the monetary
acceleration that occurred in the last half of 1980.
7. Monetary Acceleration in the
Last Half of 1980
As shown in Figure 3, the monetary acceleration
of the last half of 1980 carried M1 from well below
the four-quarter target cone to somewhat above it by
year-end. This monetary acceleration can be under-
stood by putting together the separate pieces dis-
cussed above. In the late spring, the new operating
procedures pushed the funds rate sharply lower in
response to the monetary deceleration produced by
the SCRP. The end of this program allowed the
economy to revive and caused a resurgence of credit
demands. The funds rate was at too low a level to
prevent a monetary acceleration. Borrowed reserves
rose in response to the overshoot of the M1 target in
August. Because banks had been out of the window,
however, this increase in borrowed reserves initially
produced only a small increase in the funds rate. In
an environment of concern over the recession, how-
ever, the Fed did not make discretionary changes in
its operating variables that would have raised the
funds rate [“Monetary Policy . . .” ( 1981), p. 73 and
Levin and Meek (1981), p. 35].
Given the persistence of the overshoot of the M1
target, the characteristics of the operating procedures
described above acted to increase the funds rate.
First, the target for borrowed reserves was raised by
the M1 overshoot. Second, the administration of the
discount window caused given levels of borrowed
reserves to produce over time a higher differential
between the funds rate and the discount rate. Third,
as the monetary acceleration persisted, the Fed be-
came concerned that the bond market would perceive
monetary policy as having become inflationary. For
this reason, as the differential between the funds rate
and the discount rate widened, it raised the discount
rate, even though the immediate effect of such an
action was to raise the funds rate and to leave this
differential unaffected. Finally, as the monetary ac-
celeration persisted, the target for nonborrowed re-
serves was lowered.
All these factors combined to force a sharp increase
in the funds rate toward year-end. The funds rate
rose about three percentage points in each of the
months November and December, reaching a peak of
20 percent early in January 1981. The new proce-
dures raised the funds rate in light of the monetary
overshoot. The subsequent monetary deceleration,
however, indicates that this process was carried too
far. An overshooting of the funds rate occurred and a
monetary deceleration ensued. This conclusion could
only be derived after the fact, however, in the absence
of a reliable means of associating targets for the
money supply with associated values of the funds
rate.
8. Monetary Deceleration in 1981
As background, it should be noted that the trans-
actions measure of the money supply targeted in 1981
was called shift-adjusted M1-B. M1 comprises all
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1981 of the new interest-bearing checkable deposits,
NOW and ATS accounts, imparted a one-time fall to
the income velocity of M1 to the extent that these
new checkable deposits were drawn from nonmone-
tary sources. Institutional arrangements encouraged
in particular the relabeling of savings accounts as
NOWs due to the existence of the same Regulation Q
ceiling on savings and NOW accounts, even though
the latter offered transactions services not offered by
the former. Shift-adjusted M1 represented an
attempt to construct a money series comparable to
the old M1 series by removing increments to NOW
and ATS accounts originating from nonmonetary
sources such as savings deposits. Considerable effort
on the part of the Board staff went into the con-
struction of the shift-adjusted M1 series [See
Bennett (1982) and Simpson (1981)]. The shift-
adjusted M1 series exhibited a sharp deceleration in
1981. Using fourth-quarter to fourth-quarter figures,
Ml grew at about 8.3 percent in 1977 and 1978. In
1979 and 1980, M1 grew at 7.5 percent and 7.3 per-
cent, respectively. In 1981, the growth rate of shift-
adjusted M1 fell to only 2.3 percent.
The economic recovery begun in the second half of
1980 extended into 1981. Real GNP grew by 8.6
percent in 1981Q1. (Subsequently, the business
cycle peak was dated as July 1981.) The irregular
slowing of the rate of growth of various price indices
provided mixed evidence on whether inflation was
slowing. The implicit GNP deflator rose by 8.9
percent from 1980Q4 to 1981Q4, a slowing of only a
percentage point from the previous year. The pro-
ducer price index rose at a 12 percent rate through
April, but rose more slowly thereafter. The rise
in the CPI moderated in the first and second quar-
ters, but rose more strongly in the third quarter. In
this economic environment, the Fed continued to be
concerned about displaying a firm anti-inflationary
posture. It was hoped that such a posture would
exercise a restraining effect on wage settlements in
1982.
The stubbornness  of our inflation in large part
reflects the adaptation of our economic and social
institutions to persistently rising prices. The
process is embedded in a whole pattern of economic,
social, and political behavior that tends to sustain
and intensify its own momentum. We see the
process at work in contracts that extend over a
period of time: in the pattern of three-year wage
bargaining, building in past or anticipated rates
of inflation into future cost. . . . The most critical
area-inevitably, because it accounts for some two-
thirds of all costs-is the trend of wages and
salaries. [Volcker (1981b), pp, 10-11]
. . . a crucially important round of union wage
bargaining begins next January, potentially setting
a pattern for several years ahead. That is one
reason why we need to be clear and convincing in
specifying our monetary and fiscal policy intentions
and their implications for the economic and infla-
tion environment. [Volcker (1981a), p. 617]
The monetary deceleration that began toward the
end of 1980 caused shift-adjusted M1 to remain
below its four-quarter target cone in the first quarter
of 1981 (Figure 3). As a consequence, the new
operating procedures pushed the funds rate down
to 14.7 percent in March. M1 grew strongly in
April, but still remained only at the lower bound-
ary of the four-quarter target cone (Figure 3).
Nevertheless, in early May the Board raised the
discount rate and the surcharge on the basic discount
rate, placing the surcharge rate at 18 percent (Figure
1). The Desk also reduced “substantially” the target
for nonborrowed reserves [“Monetary Policy . . .”
(1982), p. 47]. By May, the funds rate had been
pushed back up to 18.5 percent.
At the May 18 meeting, the FOMC emphasized
its concern that monetary policy appear firmly anti-
inflationary.
The indications of some slowing of the rise in the
consumer price index did not appear to reflect as
yet any clear relaxation of underlying inflationary
pressures, and emphasis was placed on the impor-
tance of conveying a clear sense of restraint at a
critical time with respect to inflation and infla-
tionary expectations. [Board of  Governors  (1981),
FOMC meeting held on May 18, 1981, p. 111]
In order to prevent weakness in M1 from lowering
the funds rate, the FOMC adopted an open-ended
directive with respect to the extent that growth in
shift-adjusted Ml would decline. “. . . the Committee
decided to seek behavior of reserve aggregates asso-
ciated with growth of M1-B from April to June of 3
percent or lower. . . .” [Board of Governors (1981),
FOMC meeting held on May 18, 1981, p. 112].
When M1 fell after the May FOMC meeting, the
path for total reserves derived from the M1 target
was reduced in line with reductions in actual total
reserves in order to keep borrowed reserves and the
funds rate from falling. In effect, the M1 target was
lowered in line with the fall in actual M1.
Because of the wording of the directive specifying
that M1 growth lower than 3 percent was acceptable,
the decline of M1 in May and June was not allowed
to affect the funds rate. The emphasis was placed on
the behavior of M2, which was growing strongly.
It was argued that the public’s demand function for
Ml had shifted leftward due to the growth of money
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF RICHMOND 27market funds that were serving as transactions bal-
ances and that are included in M2, but not M1.
7
“You may recall that last year [1981] M1 grew
slowly. . . . We believe that this was a reflection of
financial innovations including prominently the rapid
growth of money market funds, which to some limited
extent serve the function of transactions balances”
[Volcker (1982c), p. 10].
The Desk stopped the effective lowering of the M1
target in line with the actual value of M1 in the last
part of June; therefore, the weakness in M1 caused
borrowed reserves to fall in July. The normal effect
of this fall in producing a lower funds rate was offset,
however, probably due to the characteristic of dis-
count window administration whereby extended peri-
ods of borrowing increase the pressure on banks to
turn to the funds market. In June and July the funds
rate was at 19 percent, and in August it was almost
18 percent. Only in September did the fall in bor-
rowed reserves depress the funds rate significantly.
By early October, the shortfall of total reserves from
path had reached the unprecedented level of $370
million [“Monetary Policy . . .” (1982), p. 51].
The first significant discretionary action taken in
response to this shortfall was the one percentage
point reduction in the discount rate effective Novem-
ber 2. Shift-adjusted M1 remained well below its
four-quarter target cone throughout most of 1981.
Throughout 1981, the implementation of the new
procedures was influenced by the desire of the Fed
to convey to the public its firm anti-inflationary
resolve. “. . .a decline in short-term rates could
exacerbate inflationary expectations and abort a
desirable downtrend in bond yields and mortgage
interest rates” [Board of Governors (1981), FOMC
meeting held on November 17, 1981, p. 138].
9. Abandonment of the New Procedures
Early 1982 marks a transitional period during
which the Fed became increasingly concerned with
recession. Real GNP had remained essentially un-
changed in the second and third quarters and fell in
7 The Record of Policy Actions  states:
It was also suggested that the weakness in
growth of adjusted  M-1B in the early months of
the year might be a misleading indicator of the
behavior of transaction balances, mainly because
of the rapid growth of money market mutual
funds; some part of the large flows into those
funds might also be regarded as transaction bal-
ances. . . . In evaluating the behavior of the
aggregates, it was agreed that greater weight
than before would be given to the behavior of
M-2. [Board of Governors (1981), FOMC Meet-
ing of March 31, 1981, pp. 102-3]
the fourth quarter of 1981, while by year-end infla-
tion had clearly moderated. Consequently, the per-
ception of the economy’s most pressing problem
began to change.
Now we can see clear signs of progress on the
inflation front. . . .we are also seeing signs of
potentially more lasting changes in attitudes of
business and labor toward pricing, wage bargain-
ing, and productivity. . . . I believe the pattern is
likely to spread, “building in” lower rates of
increase in nominal wages and prices over time.
And as the inflationary and cost pressures ease,
the economy can resume a healthy pattern of
growth. . . . [Volcker (1982b), pp. 167-8]
The Fed also continued to be concerned in early 1982
about the bond market. In the last several months of
1981, the federal deficit projected for fiscal year 1982
had risen from about $40 to $110 billion. For fiscal
year 1984, projections of a balanced budget had given
way to projections of a deficit of $150 billion. In
this environment, the Fed remained concerned that
any easing of monetary policy would exacerbate the
inflationary anticipations of participants in the bond
market.
The rate of growth of M1 rose in November and
December of 1981 and surged in January 1982 to an
annual rate of 21.5 percent. The January surge
carried M1 above the level of the year-end lower
boundary of the four-quarter target cone (Figure 3).
The Fed reacted to this bulge in M1 in a way that
reflected a compromise of conflicting concerns over
recession  and the inflationary expectations of finan-
cial markets. It retained the October 1979 operating
procedures, but effectively raised the M1 target cone
used for purposes of setting intra-yearly M1 targets.
It retained the four-quarter M1 target cone for 1982
that employed as its base the realized 198lQ4 value
of M1. It added, however, for purposes of policy
discussions, a four-quarter M1 target cone for 1982
that employed  as its base the 1981Q4 midpoint of the
1981 four-quarter target  cone for M1 [Volcker
(1982a), p. 17]. The result was a moderated in-
crease in the funds rate. In 1981Q2, M1 had risen
$12 billion while the funds rate increased 550 basis
points, and the surcharge-adjusted discount rate was
raised 300 basis points. In 1982Q1, M1 rose $10
billion while the funds rate increased 235 basis points,
and the discount rate was not changed.
The primary concern of policy since October 1979
had been to convey a firm anti-inflationary stance in
order to assuage the inflationary psychology of the
public.
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almost invisible. . . . for a long while there was
little room for modifying policy in response to
domestic or international concerns. The danger
was that the wrong “signals” would only increase
the risk that the whole process of restoring sta-
bility--domestically or internationally--would be
longer delayed or even aborted. [Volcker  (1983c),
p. 3]
In response to the moderation of inflation and the
continuation of recession, economic recovery became a
primary concern of monetary policy in 1982. A key
assumption behind the design of the post-October
1979 operating procedures was the desirability of
achieving intra-yearly M1 targets. In an environ-
ment in which a concern for inflation and the infla-
tionary expectations of the public were no longer
dominant and in which the predictability of the rela-
tionship between M1 and nominal GNP appeared to
be diminishing, the desirability of attaining intra-
yearly M1 targets was increasingly questioned.
. . . we need . . . to be conscious of the fact that
the world  as it is requires elements of judgment,
interpretation, and flexibility in judging develop-
ments in money and credit and in setting appro-
priate targets. . . . we cannot always assume a
rigid relationship between money and the economy
that, may not exist over a cycle or over longer
periods of time, especially when technology, interest
rates, and expectations are changing. . . . we must
. . . take into account a wide range of financial and
nonfinancial information when assessing whether
the growth of the aggregates is consistent with the
policy intentions of the Federal Reserve. The hard
truth is that there inevitably is a critical need for
judgment in the conduct of monetary policy.
[Volcker (1982d), pp. 406-7]
Early in July, the Fed was concerned about the
liquidity of the CD market in the aftermath of the
Penn Square Bank failure. With the benefit of
hindsight, however, it now appears that, within the
context of the general concern over the economy
described above, the primary immediate catalyst to
the phasing out of the post-October 1979 operating
procedures may have been a concern over the inter-
national debt situation. The sharp appreciation of the
dollar in 1982 as well as the continued high level of
market rates precipitated the situation in which nu-
merous countries neared default on their external
debt. The  Record of Policy Actions  of the FOMC
indicates that the Fed began negotiating with the
Bank of Mexico in June to furnish reserves under the
existing swap arrangement [Board (1982a), p. 120].
Apparently, such negotiations were accompanied by
the fear that defaults by large debtor nations would
threaten the world financial system.
. . . we have to evaluate the significance of develop-
ments abroad as well as at home, as reflected in
trade accounts and the exchange rate, and of
strains in the financial structure itself. [Volcker
(1982f), p. 747]
. . . the potential for an international financial
disturbance impairing the functioning of our do-
mestic financial markets at a critical point in our
recovery is real. [Volcker (1983b), p. 170]
Coping with the international debt situation ap-
peared to require a substantial reduction in the level
of interest rates in the United States for a variety of
reasons. First, because much of the debt of third-
world countries in particular was of short maturity, a
lower interest rate would reduce the burden of inter-
est payments as debt was rolled over. Second,
because this debt was denominated in dollars, a lower
rate of interest in the United States would facilitate
repayment by limiting the contemporaneous appreci-
ation of the dollar. Third, a lower rate of interest in
the United States would spur the U. S. economy and
in the process increase the exports of debtor nations
and their supply of foreign exchange. Finally, a
lower rate of interest in the United States would
allow central banks of other industrialized countries
to lower their bank rates. The resulting stimulus to
their economies would increase their imports from
debtor countries. “. . .an environment of sustained
recovery and expansion in the industrialized world  is
critically important” [Volcker (1983a), p. 82].
The usefulness of the new procedures was seriously
questioned beginning in July.
Moreover--and I would emphasize this--growth
somewhat above the targeted ranges would be
tolerated for a time in circumstances in which it
appeared that precautionary or liquidity motiva-
tions, during a period of economic uncertainty and
turbulence, were leading to stronger-than-antici-
pated demands for money. We will look to a
variety of factors in reaching that judgment, in-
cluding such technical factors as the behavior of
different components in the money supply, the
growth of credit, the behavior of banking and
financial markets, and more broadly, the behavior
of velocity and interest rates. I believe it is timely
for me to add that, in these circumstances, the
Federal Reserve should not be expected to respond,
and does not plan to respond, strongly to various
bulges--or for that matter “valleys”--in monetary
growth that seem likely to be temporary. [Volcker
(1982e), p. 491]
Beginning in the middle of July, the funds rate was
lowered significantly through reductions in the dis-
count rate and increases in the target for nonbor-
rowed reserves. From the end of June to the end of
August, the funds rate fell from about 15 percent to
about 9 percent. (At the time, M1 was just within
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above their target ranges.) The October 1979 pro-
cedures were revived for the last time in September
when the resurgence of M1 growth was allowed to
increase the target for borrowed reserves and the
funds rate rose a percentage point. The increase in
the funds rate was brought to an end by a large in-
crease in the target for nonborrowed reserves.
8 At
its meeting on October 5, the FOMC formally
dropped M1 as a target of policy. It was argued
that M1 for the time being was no longer a useful
target because the maturing of All Savers Certifi-
cates in October and the introduction of money
market deposit accounts in December would render
its behavior difficult to interpret. Formally, M2 and
M3 were retained as targets, but the Record of Policy
Actions  for the October 5 FOMC meeting indicates
that continued growth above their target ranges
would not affect the funds rate.
Higher rates of growth of Ml in the last half of
1982 could have been achieved through raising the
Ml target and retaining the new operating proced-
ures. Instead, the new procedures were phased out.
The funds rate was lowered, primarily as a conse-
quence of a series of reductions in the discount rate,
and whatever increase occurred in the rate of growth
of M1 was accepted. Initially, this reduction in the
funds rate caused the bond market to rally. The
market apparently viewed the reduction in the funds
rate as a judgment by the Fed that the level of
market rates necessary in order to control inflation
had fallen. This judgment was apparently accepted
by the market on the basis of the sustained reduction
in inflation that had occurred and on the basis of the
anti-inflationary credibility that the Fed had estab-
lished in 1981. In retrospect, the process of lowering
market rates ended in December when a reduction in
8 The following discussion is contained in  the annual
report of open market operations for 1982 by the New
York Desk:
. . . it was clear that mechanical adherence to
reserve path procedures would result in a bor-
rowing gap in the final two weeks of around $900
million (even before any allowance for special
situation borrowing), implying considerable up-
ward interest rate pressure. The Committee
reviewed recent developments at a conference
call on September 24. It was the Committee
consensus that some accommodation of the more
rapid growth of money was consistent with the
directive adopted at the August meeting in view
of the strength in NOW accounts, the overall
weakness in-the economy, and  the  fragility  of
worldwide financial conditions. Hence, the non-
borrowed reserve path was adjusted to limit
implied borrowing to the $500 million to $550
million area. [italics added] [“Monetary Policy
. .  .” (1983), p. 53]
the discount rate of half a percentage point left
intermediate-term and long-term rates unchanged.
By December, investors had again become concerned
over a resurgence of M1 growth.
10. Evaluating the October 1979
Operating Procedures
It is difficult to evaluate the post-October 1979
procedures. First, for a variety of reasons, they were
not implemented consistently over the interval from
October 1979 until their demise in 1982. In spring
1980, they were superseded by the SCRP, the objec-
tive of which was to control credit, not money. In
early summer 1981, they were overridden. Second,
the new procedures were extremely complicated from
a technical standpoint. Monetary control was effected
through the funds rate. The funds rate was deter-
mined indirectly by the level of borrowed reserves,
which was in turn determined by the nonborrowed
reserves target, given the predetermined demand for
required reserves and the demand for excess reserves.
Despite the difficulty in evaluating the new pro-
cedures, there is reason to believe that they were not
well designed for purposes of monetary control. [A
similar conclusion is reached in McCallum (1985).
Lindsey (1984) reaches a different conclusion.]
Most important, they possessed the same basic defect
as the pre-October 1979 operating procedures. The
new procedures, like the old, effected monetary con-
trol through the funds rate. Neither before nor after
October 1979 was there a reliable model that could
determine the value of the funds rate that would
produce the targeted value of the money supply. By
default the new procedures, like the old, relied on a
simple feedback mechanism whereby, as long as an
overshoot of the money supply target existed, the
funds rate would rise, and conversely. The pre-
sumption was that the old procedures of monetary
control had failed not through inherent problems with
using the funds rate to effect monetary control, but
rather because of strict limitations in the allowable
magnitude of changes in the funds rate. Similarly,
it was assumed that the new procedures would work
because of the virtual elimination of a constraint on
the magnitude of changes in the funds rate.
The simple feedback mechanism of the new mone-
tary control procedures for determining borrowed
reserves and the funds rate, taken in combination
with the lags inherent in monetary control, appear in
retrospect to have produced an overshooting and
undershooting of the funds rate necessary in order to
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9 Judged by the experience in
the last half of 1980 in particular, a money supply and
funds rate cycle would begin with a funds rate too
low to prevent a monetary acceleration. Initially, the
monetary acceleration would proceed while the funds
rate would be little changed, but later the funds rate
would rise sharply.
10 This behavior of the funds rate
may have been produced by the administration of the
discount window. When banks had been out of the
discount window, a rise in borrowed reserves would
initially have little impact on the funds rate. After
banks had been in the window for some time, how-
ever, the new, higher level of borrowed reserves
would produce a sharp rise in the funds rate. The
sharp rise in the funds rate in time would produce a




In the preceding paragraphs, a chronological ac-
count was offered of the formulation and implementa-
tion of monetary policy in the early 1980s. The
character of monetary policy during this period was
9 Goodfriend et al (1986) address the issue of whether
the new procedures induced cyclical movements in the
funds rate and, by implication, the money supply. Ac-
cording to their analysis, the resolution of this issue
depends upon whether the level of borrowed reserves was
set using the rule of thumb outlined in the initial de-
scriptions of the new procedures or whether it was set
on the basis of an analytical model capturing the relation-
ship, running through the funds rate, between borrowed
reserves and M1. Which assumption is a more appro-
priate description of the post-October 1979 operating
procedures is an empirical issue not dealt with in their
paper.
10 Examination of the annual reviews of open market
operations published in the Federal Reserve Bank of
New York  Quarterly Review  reveals that only twice was
the target for nonborrowed reserves chanced promptly
upon the first appearance of a miss of the M1 target
(March 1980 and May 1981). (The nonborrowed  reserves
target was changed on other occasions in response to a
persistent miss of the M1 target.) Prompt alterations of
the nonborrowed reserves target after an M1 target miss
would have evened out this temporal pattern of the
funds rate.
11 Furthermore, the inflationary environment of the early
1980s and the rise in the magnitude of the government
deficit seemed to produce a belief among participants in
the bond market that the level of interest rates would
have to rise in order to contain inflation. There was,
however, great uncertainty over what rise in interest
rates would be required. In this uncertain financial
environment, participants in the bond market watched the
funds rate closely for information as to the Fed’s judg-
ment of what rate of interest would provide for monetary
control. Consequently, changes in the funds rate were
passed on to the entire maturity spectrum of interest
rates.
shaped by a concern over the high rate of inflation.
It is, nevertheless, misleading to speak of a mone-
tarist experiment. Policy actions were not guided
by a rule.
The post-October 1979 operating procedures in-
corporated significant concessions to monetary con-
trol. Short-term targets for M1 were derived from
annual targets and significant movement in the funds
rate was permitted. The new procedures adopted
nonborrowed reserves targeting. Given lagged re-
serve accounting, however, nonborrowed reserves
targeting resulted in a monetary control procedure
that worked through the funds rate. The new pro-
cedures, then, possessed the same problem as the old
procedures, namely, the absence of an analytical
model that could be relied upon in practice to deter-
mine the value of the Desk’s operating variable from
the money supply target. Consequently, changes in
the funds rate had to be determined by a rule of
thumb. It was argued that the new procedures con-
tributed to unnecessary movements in the money
supply and interest rates.
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